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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK HATTON-WARD, an 
Individual, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
and MIKE CHABRIES, in his 
capacity as Chief of the 
Salt Lake City Police 
Department, a Law Enforcement 
Agency, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Respondent Frank Hatton-Ward, Plaintiff in the District Court, 
hereby submits this Brief in Opposition to the Petition of 
Defendants below for a Writ of Certiorari. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole substantive question before this Court is whether 
the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting a statute that gives an 
aggrieved public employee a right to commence an action in state 
court without first exhausting Civil Service Commission 
administrative remedies, under the Utah Protection of Public 
1 
District Court 
Case No. 890906662CV 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 910585-CA 
Employees Act (the so-called "whistle blower" act), Utah Code Ann* 
Sec* 67-21-1, et* seq, (1953, as amended) which reads in pertinent 
part as follows: 
An employee who alleges a violation of this 
chapter may bring a civil action for 
appropriate injunctive relief or actual 
damages, or both, within 180 days after the 
occurrence of the alleged violation of this 
chapter* 
• • • 
An action begun under this section may be brought 
in the circuit court for the county where the 
alleged violation occurred.... 
As stated by the Court of Appeals, "the sole issue before this 
court is one of statutory interpretation.... whether the whistle 
blower statute implicitly incorporates the requirements of the 
civil service statute." Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 
18 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (1992). 
REFERENCE TO THE OPINION ISSUED BY THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals decision of March 17, 1992, [182 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah App. 1992)], from which appeal is sought, is 
attached as appendix "A" and is incorporated here by this 
reference. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended), and to Rule 45 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF THE 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
The determinative statute is the Utah Protection of Public 
Employees Act (the "whistle blower" act), Utah Code Ann, § 67-21-
1 et. seq. « (1953 as amended), (A true copy of the statute is 
attached as Appendix B and is incorporated here by this reference.) 
This is the only statute or rule (other than the rules of civil and 
appellate procedure) that applies to this case. The statutes and 
rules of the Civil Service Commission, Utah Code Ann. Sec.10-3-
1001< et. seq., (1953, as amended) were looked to by the Court of 
Appeals only as a comparison to the rights and remedies granted in 
the whistle blower act for purposes of applying the rules of 
statutory construction, in response to Petitioner's arguments that 
the Civil Service statutes were impliedly incorporated into the 
whistle blower act. The Civil Service act is not determinative of 
the issues raised here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff was a fourteen-year veteran of the Salt Lake City 
police officer when he was fired on October 30, 1989. Plaintiff 
filed a "whistle blower" complaint against Defendant-Respondent on 
November 2, 1989, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec 67-21-1 et. seq. 
(1953, as amended). 
Plaintiff had been harassed and was ultimately fired because 
he repeatedly advised his superiors at the Salt Lake City Police 
Department that he had discovered important evidence regarding the 
3 
identity of two murderers of young women. Plaintiff warned those 
in command that the Defendants, Salt Lake City Police Department 
and Salt Lake City, were wasting and misusing public funds by 
refusing to pursue his compelling evidence, by losing critical 
evidence, by ignoring the testimony of self-proclaimed 
eyewitnesses, by rejecting the analysis of the identity of the 
murderers prepared by the Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit 
(hereafter "CAUM), and by ultimately disbanding the well-respected 
CAU whose analysis supported Plaintiff's findings. 
When neither the Department nor its Chief would act on his 
information, and when he was warned to stay out of the cases, 
Plaintiff took his evidence to various other law enforcement 
agencies and finally petitioned the Intermediate Court of Appeals 
for a writ of mandamus on May 2, 1989. 
The mandamus was dismissed, on jurisdictional grounds, and as 
soon as it was dismissed, Respondent was promptly brought up on 
charges based on procured testimony, following which he was 
harassed, disciplined, threatened and ultimately fired, all in 
retaliation for his "blowing the whistle." 
Within the time prescribed by the whistle blower statute, 
Plaintiff filed the action below in District Court, seeking 
damages, as the whistle blower act permits a direct action in 
Court. Utah Code Ann. § 6-7-21-4 (2), (3) (1953, as amended.) 
The trial Court dismissed Respondents complaint on the ground 
that he had failed to exhaust his remedies before the Civil Service 
Commission. On February 23, 1990. Respondent appealed to this 
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Court, the matter was put before the Intermediate Court of Appeals 
and on March 17, 1992, after full briefing and oral argument the 
Intermediate Court of appeals applied the literal language of the 
whistle blower statute, reversed the trial court and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Utah State Legislature enacted the so-called whistle 
blower act in 1985. As the Court of Appeals found: 
[T]he plain and unambiguous language explicitly shows, 
with our emphases, that jurisdiction clearly vests in 
the state court and not with the [Civil Service] 
Commission: "An employee ... may bring a civil action 
... [Sec] 67-21-4(2). An action ... may be brought in 
the circuit court where the complainant resides, or the 
county where the person against whom the civil complaint 
is filed resides. ... [sec] 67-21-4(3). A court, in 
rendering a .judgment in an action ... may order [lists 
remedies]. A court may also award the complainant ... 
the costs of litigation, ... if the court determines that 
the award is appropriate. ... [sec.] 67-71-5. [182 Utah 
Adv. Rep., supra, at p. 45] 
2. Respondent served written notice upon his employers of 
"waste of public funds, property or manpower" Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
67-21-3(1), by, among other means, filing a mandamus action with 
the Intermediate Court of Appeals on May 2, 1990. 
3. Respondent was brought up on unsupported charges and was 
dismissed on October 30, 1989. 
4. Respondent filed a complaint under the whistle blower 
statue in Third District Court on November 16, 1989. 
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5. The trial court dismissed the whistle blower case for 
failure of Respondent to exhaust administrative remedies on 
February 23, 1990. 
6. Respondent appealed and after full briefing (including 
the rejection of cross-motions for summary disposition) the 
Intermediate Court of Appeals ruled on March 17, 1992 that: 
We thus see nothing in the plain and unambiguous language 
of either the whistle blower statute or the civil service 
statute suggesting a claimant must first bring a whistle 
blower claim to the Commission before proceeding in state 
court. [192 Utah Adv. Rep., supra, at p. 45] 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISIONS RAISES 
NO ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION BY 
THIS COURT 
Petitioner's arguments as to why the Court of Appeals decision 
raises important questions that should be settled by this Court 
begs the question. Petitioner postulates that the Court of Appeals 
articulated a statement of far-reaching policy in governmental 
employer-employee relations, and then argues that such policy 
adjudication should be resolved by this Court. 
But The Court of Appeals' decision was premised upon, and 
correctly applied, only the basic, uncontroverted law of statutory 
construction in Utah, and its application of that law was so 
consistent with prior cases as to raise no new controversy for this 
court to adjudicate. The Court of Appeals stated the law that it 
applied as follows: 
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When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do 
not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. 
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rather, we construe a statute according to its plain 
language. Brinkerhoff, 779 p. 2d at 686. Specifically, 
we will not interpret unambiguous language in a state to 
contradict its plain meaning. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 
497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam): Johnson v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988). 
Moreover, "where two statutes treat the same subject 
matter, and one statute is general while the other is 
specific, the specific provision controls." Floyd v. 
Western Surgical Assoc. Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 
App. 1989); accord, Williams v. Public Serv.Comm'n; 7 54 
P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 
1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990). 
The Court of Appeals has not decided that "artful pleading" 
can circumvent important policies governing employee grievances. 
Rather, it has decided that when a state statute says "court" it 
does not mean "Commission"; when it says "damages" it does not mean 
merely reinstatement; and where it says "civil action" it does not 
mean administrative proceeding with wholly different burdens of 
proof and rights on appeal. 
The Court of Appeals did not deprive government of the 
ability to correct employment errors, it deprived government of the 
ability to implement its administrative policies in contravention 
of a strict statutory right. The decision below merely recognized 
that a specific state statute granting a "civil action" does in 
fact grant a "civil action". Petitioner's arguments were best made 
to the legislature, when the whistle-blower act was being debated 
in 1985. 
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One looks in Appellants' brief in vain for the case law that 
shows its petition falls within the confines of Rule 45 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. There is no case that holds, or 
should hold, that it is improper or against public policy to 
construe the literal language of a statute literally. This issue 
has long been resolved by this Court and need not be addressed 
again now. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS'S DECISIONS IS NOT IN 
CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
Petitioners miss the point before this court by arguing that 
there is a matter of state law in conflict with decisions of this 
court up for review, based on the erroneous assumption that the 
court of appeals decided issue of state law beyond statutory 
construction. As noted above, the cases upon which the statutory 
construction was based were cases of this court, and of the court 
of appeals, for which no contravening case law can be cited. The 
cases petitioners argue are in conflict, are those which articulate 
a policy which petitioner argued below contravene "plain language" 
construction. That is, they are cases that may support an argument 
to the legislature, but not one to this court or to the court of 
appeals. 
The court of appeals took care to address petitioners' 
citations of law and found: 
First, both cases [to the effect that the Civil Service 
Commission has primary jurisdiction over all civil 
service employee discharges] were decided before the 
whistle blower statute was enacted. More importantly, 
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the issue before the Commission in both cases was 
confined to whether the discharges should stand. 
[As to the petitioner's argument that] the two statutes 
should be construed together and harmonized because they 
have [a] common purpose... it is not possible to 
"harmonize" the two statutes so as to include an 
exhaustion requirement in the whistle blower statute. 
[T]he subject matter of the two statues is different: 
The civil service statute provides a review as to whether 
a civil employee's discharge should or should not sand, 
whereas the whistle blower statute provides a civil cause 
of action and broad civil remedies when an employee 
alleges the employer threatened, discriminated against 
or discharged the employee for whistleblowing. 1 [182 
Adv.Rep. at p. 46] 
[In footnote 1 the court of appeals considered 
petitioner's argument that the federal whistle blower's 
statute has been interpreted to require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. "This argument fails because 
the federal statute is not parallel to the state statute, 
as it creates no civil cause of action and provides no 
remedies other than reinstatement." 182 Adv. Rep. at p., 
46, fn. 1.] 
Petitioners endeavored below to argue from a body of law that 
was inapposite to the questions at hand. The law they cited is 
immaterial to the exclusive issues of statutory construction on 
which the dismissal of the case at the trial court level was 
founded. The court of appeals correctly apprehended the narrow 
issues to be decided, and properly explained why the exhaustive 
law and policy arguments of petitioners below did not govern the 
legal question presented. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioners' citations of errors are points that should 
have been made to the legislature when it enacted the Protection 
of Public Employees Act. The arguments raised are similar to those 
that government employers might have raised to special employee 
9 
protection statutes such as Title VII to the federal Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The petitioners' complaint is that they do not wish 
to be subject to the law as it is; the means of voicing this 
objection is to argue that the law is not what it so obviously is. 
Such arguments must fail in the courts, else the legislative branch 
of government is not free to make state law and to thereby set 
policy via legislation aimed at protecting special classes of 
persons from perceived societal ills that do them special harm. 
Petitioners' arguments to not support this court's exercise 
of its jurisdiction to grant certiorari. Therefore, the petition 
for the writ should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of May, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the above RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORIARI was served upon the following named below by 
depositing it, postage prepaid, into the United States Mail. DATED 
this 24th day of September, 1990. 
Roger F. Cutler 
Frank M. Nakamura 
451 South State, Suite 505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX 
A. The Court of Appeals decision of March 17, 1992, Hatton-Ward 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., et, al. , 182 Utah Adv. Rep, 44 (Utah App. 
1992) 
B, Protection of Public Employees Act, Utah Code Ann, Sec, 67-
21-1 et. seq. (1953, as amended) 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Frank HATTON-WAUD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
T . 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, and 
Mike Chabnes, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Ho. 910S85-CA 
FILED: March 17, 1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Leonard H. Russoa 
ATTORNEYS: 
Suzanne M. Dailimore, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Roger F. Cutler and Frank M. Nakamura, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Frank Hatton-Ward appeals an order 
dismissing his complaint in which he alleges 
Salt Lake City Corporation (City) wrongfully 
terminated his employment in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §67-21-1 (1986 & Supp. 
1991) (whistle blower statute). The oral court 
dismissed his complaint for failure to first 
exhaust his administrative remedies before the 
Civil Service Commission (Commission) pur-
suant to Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1012 
(1986) (civil service statute). We reverse. 
FACTS 
Although. Hatton-Ward presents a detailed 
and lengthy factual statement in his bnef, we 
find no need to reiterate ail of the facts in 
order to address the issues oa appeaL There-
fore, we state an abbreviated version of the 
events leading to his termination. 
Hatton-Ward was a member of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department, up until October 
30, 1989, when he was fired. From 1985 to 
1988, a number of young women were murd-
ered in Sale Lake City and neighboring com-
munities. These murders were apparently 
related. Although the police made some arrests 
in connection with the investigation, Hatton* 
Ward believed some of the perpetrators were 
soil at large, so he continued his own unaut-
horized investigation. 
Because Hatton-Ward believed his super- I 
tors were intentionally ignoring his leads, he 
took his information to higher authorities, 
including the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
Hatton-Ward eventually petitioned this court 
for a wnt of mandamus to compel the City to 
follow his leads and pursue the invesDgation 
more efficiently. This court denied the petition 
without prejudice based on lack of jurisdic-
tion. Shortly thereafter, Hatton-Ward was 
terminated from his position for uisubordin-
I atioa, neglect of duties, misconduct, incomp-
etency, and failure to observe the rules of the 
I department. 
Hatton-Ward then sued the City and Mike 
Chabnes, the Salt Lake City Chief of Police, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §67-21-1, the 
whistle blower statute. This statute prohibits 
terminations, threats and discrimination by 
employers m retaiianon for employees' having 
called attention to misuse and waste of public 
funds. Hattoa-Ward sought damages of six 
I million dollars. However, he did not seek 
| reinstatement. 
The district court dismissed the suit because 
Hatton-Ward failed to exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies before the Commission purs-
uant to Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1012. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue before this court is one of 
statutory interpretation: whether Hatton-
Ward, as a government employee, is required 
to first exhaust his administrative remedies 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1012 
before commencing an action in state court 
under the whistle blower statute, Utah Code 
Ann. §67-21-1. In other words, the issue is 
whether the whistle blower statute implicitly 
incorporates che requirements of the avil 
service statute. 
We do not defer co a cnai court's interpre-
tation of a statute, and thus review it indepe-
ndently. Mendez /. Stare, 313 P.2d 1234, 1236 
(Utah App. 1991); Stare v. Swapp, 308 P.2d 
115,120 (Utah App. 1991). 
When statutory language is plain and una-
mbiguous, we do not look beyond the same to 
divine legislative intent. Bnnkerhoff v. Forsyth, 
779 P.2d <S85, 6B6 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Singh. 319 ?2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rather, we construe a statute according to its 
plain language. Bnnkerhoff* 779 P.2d at 686. 
Specifically, we will not interpret unambiguous 
language in a statute to contradict its plain 
meaning. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 4.97, 
500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam); Johnson v. 
Utah Stare Reoremenr Bd.. 770 P.2d 93, 95 
(Utah 1988). 
Moreover, 'where two statutes treat the 
same subject matter, and one statute is general 
while the other is specific the specific provi-
sion controls. * Floyd v. Western Surgical 
Assoc*. Inc.. 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 
1989): accord Williams v. Public Serv. 
Comm'ux 754 P.2d 41.48 (Utah 1988); Bagshaw 
r. Bagshavr. 788 P .2d 1057 , 1060 
(Utah-App. 1990). 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
CODE*co Hattoa-Ward v. Salt 
WHISTLE BLOWER STATUTE 
The whistle blower statute provides a cause 
of action for a government employee who 
alleges his or her employer has taken an 
'adverse action" including "to discharge, thr-
eaten, or otherwise discriminate ... in any 
manner" in' retaliation for the employee's 
havtng communicated "the existence of any 
waste of public funds, property, or manpower, 
or a violation or suspected violation of a law, 
rule, or regulation adopted under the law of 
this state." Utah Code Ann. §§67-21-2(1) 
and-3(i) (Supp. 1991). To pursue a cause of 
action, the employee brings "a civil action for 
appropriate injunctive relief or actual 
damages, or both, within 130 days after the 
occurrence of the alleged violation." Utah 
Code Ann. §67-21-4(2). To prevail, the 
plaintiff must prove the elements by a prepo-
nderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. 
§67-21-4(4). 
The remedies under this statute include 
compensation for damages for injury or loss, 
including court costs and reasonable attorney 
fees. Utah Code Ann. §67-21-4(1). Other 
remedies include reinstatement, back wages, 
reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority 
rights, actual damages, or any combination of 
these remedies. Utah Code Ann. §67-21-
5(1). In addition, the employee can seek 
compensation for costs of litigation, reason-
able attorney fees and witness fees. Utah Code 
Ann. §67-21-5(2). Finally, a court can 
order a violator of this statute to pay a civil 
fine of up to S500 to the General Fund. Utah 
Code Ann. §67-21-6. 
On Its face, we see nothing in the language 
requiring an emplovee first to bring a whistle 
blower claim to the Commission before filing 
an acnon in state court. Indeed, such an 
implied requirement would make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to bring a claim in state court 
within the required 180 days of the alleged 
violation. Utah Code Ann. §67-21-4(2). 
Moreover, the following plain and unamb-
iguous language expiiady shows, with our 
emohases, that jurisdicnon clearly vests in the 
state court and not with the Commission: "An 
employee ... may bring a civil acnon ...." 
Utah Code Ann. §67-21-4(2). "An action 
... may be brought in the dronr courr where 
the complainant resides, or the county where 
the person against whom the civil complaint is 
filed resides ....* Utah Code Ann. §67-21-
4(3). "A court* in rendering a judgment in an ac-
tion ... may order (lists remedies). A court 
may also award the complainant ... the costs 
of litigation, ... if the court determines that 
the award is appropriate." Utah Code Ann. 
567-21-5. 
In contrast, the dvii service statute, found 
a a totally different part of the Utah Code, 
rovides that civil service employees wfao are 
removed from office ... for misconduct. 
Lake City Corporation
 Agf 
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incompetency or failure to perform ... duties 
or failure to observe properly the rules of the 
department," may appeal their discharges to 
the Commission. Utah Code Ann. §10-3-
1012. The appeal to the Commission must be 
brought within five days of the date of disc-
harge. Id. The Commission then "shall fully 
hear and determine the matter. The discharged 
person shall be entided to appear in person 
and to have counsel and a public hearing." Id. 
An order from the Commission may be 
appealed co this court to determine whether 
I "the commission has abused its discretion or 
exceeded its authority." Utah Code Ann. §10-
3-10115 (Supp. 1991). See WorraU v. Qgden 
City Fire Dep'r, 616 P.2d 598. 602 (Utah 
1980). 
Both the Commission review and the appeal 
to this court involve only the issue of whether 
the discharge should stand and related quest-
ions of back pay and seniority ngnts. Utah 
Code Ann. §10-3-1012; WorraU, 616 P.2d 
at 602; Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Scrv. 
Comm'a, 575 P.2d 195. 196 (Utah 1978). 
Also, remedies such as attorney fees, cm! 
damages and civil fines are not mentioned in 
the avil service statute. Utah Code Ann. §67-
19a-406(4). 
Nothing in the language of the civil service 
statute empowers the Commission to hear 
certain claims specified in the whisde blower 
statute such as threats and discrimination 
made in retaliation for whisde blowing. Utah 
I Code Ann. § § 6 7 - 2 1 - 2 ( 1 ) a n d - 3 ( i ) . 
! Neither does the language of the avil service 
i statute suggest that the Commission is empo-
| wered to provide any remedy other than those 
I related to reinstatement. Utah Code Ann. §10-
! 3-1012; WorraU, 616 P.2d at 602; Child. 575 
I P.2d at 196. in particular, the Commission is 
I barred from granting attorney fees, which may 
I be awarded in the whisde blower statute, Utah 
| Code Ann. §67-19a-406(4), as well as civil 
i damages, and civil fines. 
! We note that here, Hatton-Ward Is not 
I seeking reinstatement, but rather avil damages 
i and attorney fees. Thus, it makes no sense to 
| require him first to go to the Commission to 
| pursue a remedy he does not want. The law 
f does not require the exhaustion of admimstr-
! ative remedies when it would serve no useful 
| purpose. State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 
j P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989); Johnson v. Utah 
State Retirement Office. 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 
(Utah 1980). Moreover, once an employee 
brings an acnon before the Commission, he or 
she is then entided only to a review of whether 
I the Commission exceeded its discretion and 
| jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. §10-3-
1012J. We thus see nothing in die plain and 
unambiguous language of either the whisde 
L blower statute or the civil service statute sug-
gesting a claimant must first bnng a whisde 
blower claim to the Commission before proc-
I eeding in state court. 
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THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS 
The City argues that the trial court properly 
dismissed the case because the Commission 
has primary jurisdiction over all such discha-
rges. However, the cases ated by the City 
support only the proposition that the Comm-
ission has original jurisdiction over whether 
the discharge itself should or should not stand. 
£.£., Worrall, 616 P.2d at 602; Child, 575 
P.2d at 195; Vcttcrh v Civil Scrv. Comm'n, 
106 Utah 83, 145 P 2d 792, 796 (Utah 1944). 
The City also argues that the Commission is 
empowered to determine whether the whistle 
blower statute was violated, despite the fact 
that the whistle blower statute vests jurisdic-
tion in state court. In support of this propos-
ition, the City cites Erkman v. Civil Scrv. 
Comm'n, 114 Utah 83, 198 P.2d 238 (Utah 
1948) and Fisher v. Civil Scrv. Comm'n, 499 
P.2d 854 (Utah 1972) While these cases 
involve emplovees discharged for alleging 
waste, they are nonetheless inapposite. First, 
both cases were decided before the whistle 
blower statute was enacted. More importantly, 
the issue before the Commission m both cases 
was confined to whether the discharges should 
stand. 
Finally, the City argues that the two statutes 
should be construed together and harmonized 
because they have the common purpose of 
giving terminated employees the opportunity 
to seek review of their terminations. In 
support of this argument, the City cites Murray 
City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 
(Utah 1983) (statutes referring to same subject 
matter should be construed with reference to 
each other and harmonized where possible). 
First, for reasons discussed above, it is not 
possible to "harmonize" the two statutes so as 
to mclude an exhaustion requirement m the 
whistle blower statute. Second, the subject 
matter of the two statutes is different: The 
cml service statute provides a review as to 
whether a avil employee's discharge should or 
should not stand, whereas the whistle blower 
statute provides a civil cause of action and 
broad civil remedies when an employee alleges 
the employer threatened, discriminated 
against, or discharged the employee for whistle 
blowing.1 Third, other state courts have found 
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
not required where the remedy sought is one 
that the administrative body is not empowered 
to provide. See Pounds v Demson, 115 Idaho 
381, 766 P.2d 1262, 1265-66 (Ct. App 1988) 
[actions sounding in tort cannot be remedied 
Dy administrative body, thus exhaustion not 
•equired); Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 
P.2d 994, 1006 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) 
'exhaustion not required when existing admi-
ustrative remedies arc ill-adapted to provide 
elief sought, and when issue is one of law 
ather than one committed to administrative 
liscretion and expertise). Finally, there is 
nothing disharmonious in our construction 
that employees who seek review of whether 
their discharge should stand must exhaust their 
administrative remedies pursuant to the cml 
service statute, while those employees who 
allege retaliation for whistle blowing may seek 
relief in state court pursuant to the whistle 
blower statute. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the order of dismissal on the 
ground that the trial court erred m dismissing 
Hatton-Ward's complaint for failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies. 
Reversed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1 The Citv also cues to what it claims is the federal 
equivalent of the Utah whistle blower statute. 5 
U S.C. §2302 This federal statute has been inter-
preted to include an exhaustion requirement, where 
consututionai issues are not involved. Borrcll v. 
United States Int'I Communications Agency, 682 
F2d 981, 987-88 (D.C. Or. 1982). This argument 
fails because the federal statute is not parallel to the 
state statute, as it creates no civil cause of action 
and provides no remedies other than reinstatement. 
Gteas 
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UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
APPENDIX B 
67-20-4 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
67-20-4. Approval of volunteer. 
A volunteer may not donate any service to an agency unless the volunteer's 
services are approved by the chief executive of that agency or his authorized 
representative, and by the office of personnel having jurisdiction over that 
agency. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 174, § 4. 
Cross-References. — State personnel man-
agement system. Chapter 19 of this title. 
67-20-5. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1986, ch. 136, § 4 repeals 
§ 67-20-5. as enacted by Laws 1983, ch. 174, 
§ 5, concerning the calculation of benefits. 
CHAPTER 21 
PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES 
Section Section 
67-21-1. Short title. 67-21-6. Civil fine. 
67-21-2. Definitions. 67-21-7. No impairment of employee rights 
67-21-3. Reporting of governmental viola- under collective bargaining 
tions of law — Employer action agreement 
— Exceptions. 67-21-8. No compensation when participation 
67-21-4. Remedies for employee bringing ac- in public inquiry. 
tion — Proof required. 67-21-9. Notice of contents of this chapter — 
67-21-5. Court orders for violation of chapter. Posting. 
67-21-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Protection of Public Employees Act." 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-U enacted by L. the time limit of Utah Const., Art. VHf Sec 8 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. without the governor's signature, or in the case 
Effective Dates, — Laws 1985, ch. 216, § 2 of a veto, the date of veto override. Approved 
provides that the act shall take effect upon ap- March 19, 1985. 
proval by the governor, or the day following 
67-21-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Employee" means a person who performs a service for wages or 
other remuneration under a contract of hire, written or oral, express or 
implied, for the state or a political subdivision of the state. 
(2) "Employer" means the state or any political subdivision of the state 
which has one or more employees. Employer includes an agent of an 
employer. 
(3) "Public body" means all of the following: 
354 
PBOTECTION OF EMPLOYEES 67-21-3 
(a) a state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau, 
board, commission, council, authority, educational institution, or any 
other body in the executive branch of state government. 
(b) an agency, board, commission, council, institution member, or 
employee of the legislative branch of state government. 
(c) a county, city, town, regional governing body, council, school 
district, special district, or municipal corporation, board, department, 
commission, council, agency, or any member or employee thereof. 
(d) any other body which is created by state or local authority or 
which is primarily funded by or through state or local authority, or 
any member or employee of that body. 
(e) a law enforcement agency or any member or employee of a law 
enforcement agency. 
(f) the judiciary and any member or employee of the judiciary. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-2, enacted by L. Legislative department, Utah Const.. Art. 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. VL 
Cross-References. — Executive depart- State Highway Patrol, Chapter 10 of Title 
ment, Utah Const.. Art. VIL 27. 
Judicial department, Utah Const, Art. VTEL State institutions. Title 64. 
67-21-3. Reporting of governmental violations of law — 
Employer action — Exceptions. 
(1) An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise bring a per-
sonal action against an employee affecting in any manner the employee's 
employment, including but not limited to as compensation, terms, benefits, 
conditions, location, rights, immunities, or privileges whenever the employee, 
or a person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, acts in any fashion, 
including verbal, written, broadcast, or other form of communication to report 
the existence of any waste of public funds, property, or manpower, or a viola-
tion of a law, or rule promulgated under the law of this state, a political 
subdivision of this state, or any recognized entity of the United States, unless: 
(a) The employee has not given written notice of, or otherwise formally 
informed the employer of the violation or reasonable suspicion of a viola-
tion, and the employee has allowed the employer sufficient time to take 
appropriate corrective action; or 
(b) The employee has not conformed to reasonable procedures 
administratively established by the employer for reporting such matters 
to the appropriate administrators; or 
(c) The employee knows or hfts reason to know that the report is mali-
cious, false, or frivolous, 
(2) An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise bring a per-
sonal action against an employee affecting in any manner the employee's 
employment, including but not limited to compensation, terms, benefits, con-
ditions, location, rights, immunities, or privileges whenever a public body 
requests the employee's participation in an investigation, hearing, inquiry, or 
other form of administrative review held by the public body. 
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History: C. 1953, 67-21-3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Libel. Chapter 2 of 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. Title 45, § 76-9-501 et seq. 
67-21-4. Remedies for employee bringing action — Proof 
required. 
(1) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil 
action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within 90 
days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter. 
(2) An action commenced under Subsection (1) may be brought in the cir-
cuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county 
where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom 
the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business* 
(3) As used in Subsection (1) "damages" means damages for injury or loss 
caused by each violation of this chapter, including reasonable attorney fees. 
(4) An employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that he or a 
person acting on his behalf was intending to report, verbally or in writing, a 
violation or a suspected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision 
of this state, or the United States, to a public body. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-4, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Grounds for injunc-
1985, ch. 216, § 1. tion. Rule 65A, U.R.C.P. 
67-21-5. Court orders for violation of chapter. 
A court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought under this chapter, 
shall order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee 
at the same level, the payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe 
benefits and seniority rights, actual damages, or any combination of these 
remedies. A court may also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs 
of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, if the court 
determines that the award is appropriate. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-5, enacted by L. Cross-References* — Award of attorney 
1985, ch. 216% § 1. fees, § 78-27-56. 
67-21-6. Civil fine. 
(1) A person who violates this chapter is liable for a civil fine of not more 
than $500. 
(2) A civil fine which is ordered under this chapter shall be submitted to the 
state treasurer for deposit in the General Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-6, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Definition of "Gen-
1985, ch. 216, § 1. era! Fund." § 67-4-2. 
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67-21-7. No impairment of employee rights under collec-
tive bargaining agreement 
This chapter shall not be construed to diminish or impair the rights of an 
employee under any collective bargaining agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-7, enacted by L. tions and collective bargaining, Chapter 20 of 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. Title 34. 
Cr088-References. — Employment reU-
67-21-8, No compensatioii when participation in public in-
quiry. 
This chapter shall not be construed to require an employer to compensate 
an employee for participation in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by 
a public body in accordance with § 67-21-3. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-8, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 216, § 1. 
67-21-9. Notice of contents of this chapter — Posting. 
An employer shall post notices and use other appropriate means to keep 
employees informed of their protections and obligations under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-9, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 216, § L 
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